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Limiting global warming to 2 °C will likely entail the complete phase-out of coal-based
electricity generation without carbon capture and storage (CCS). The timing and rate of this
phase-out will depend on the stringency of near-term climate policy and will have important
implications for the stranding of coal power plant capacity without CCS. The objectives of this
paper are to better understand the relationship between near-term climate policy and
stranded coal capacity (assuming a long-term goal of limiting warming to 2 °C) and to explore
strategies for reducing stranded capacity. Our analysis suggests that strengthening near-term
climate policy (i.e., lowering the global greenhouse gas emission target in 2030) generally
reduces stranded coal capacity and its costs. An effective strategy for reducing stranded
capacity is to minimize new construction of coal capacity without CCS, which can be accom-
plished by reducing electricity demand through energy intensity improvements and/or by
keeping existing plants operating through lifetime extensions. Another strategy, providing
emission exemptions for pre-existing coal plants (i.e., grandfathering), would eliminate
stranded capacity, but also decreases the likelihood of achieving the 2 °C target. Finally, the
ability of CCS retrofits to significantly reduce stranded capacity depends on how quickly the
technology can be deployed.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Keywords:
Integrated assessment modeling
Near-term climate policy
Coal-based electricity generation without CCS
Premature retirement
Stranded capacity
CCS retrofit
1. Introduction
Limiting the increase in mean global temperature to 2 °C
relative to the pre-industrial level1 will likely entail transforming
the global energy system from one that relies on fossil fuels for
~80% of its total primary energy supply (TPES) to a system
supplied predominantly by low carbon technologies, such as
renewables, nuclear, and biomass with carbon capture and
storage (CCS) [1] and [2,3]. Integrated assessment models
(IAMs) and energy-economic models indicate that this
transformation will require a phase-out of fossil-based elec-
tricity generation without CCS over the next century [4,5]. The
timing and rate of this phase-out will depend on the
implementation and stringency of climate policy and will
have important implications for fossil-based power plant
operators and utilities.
Given the large investments and long operating lifetimes
(typically 30–50 years) associated with fossil-based power
plants, the implications of climate policy for the stranding of
fossil-based power capacity are particularly interesting. Stranded
capacity is essentially the installed capacity that is not utilized
when a plant is operating below the load factor for which it
is designed. It generally occurs when the cost of electricity
generation renders capacity uncompetitive in the electricity
market. With climate policy, this can occur at fossil-based
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 89–102
⁎ Corresponding author at: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria. Tel.: +43 2236 807 490.
E-mail address: johnsonn@iiasa.ac.at (N. Johnson).
1 This is roughly equivalent to achieving an atmospheric CO2-equivalent
(CO2e) concentration of 450 ppm in 2100.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.02.028
0040-1625/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Technological Forecasting & Social Change
plants when payments for CO2 emissions increase operating
costs. If severe, stranded capacity can warrant the premature
retirement of existing power plants and can have significant
financial implications for plant operators.
The risk of stranded capacity is particularly large for coal-
basedpower plantswithout CCS as these carbon-intensive plants
become uncompetitive in scenarios that limit warming to 2 °C
and, thus, are phased out rapidly [2,6]. However, coal currently
accounts for ~40% of global electricity generation [1] and,
without stringent climate policy, its use is expected to increase
over the next twodecades, particularly in China and India,where
coal currently accounts for about 80% and 70% of electricity
generation, respectively [7]. Thus, given less stringent climate
policy over the next two decades, commitments to new coal
capacity are expected to increase, resulting in more risk of
stranded capacity once policy shifts to support the
long-term goal of limiting warming to 2 °C. Furthermore,
the risk of stranded capacity is expected to be concentrated
disproportionately in China and India, which has implica-
tions for the willingness of these countries to participate in
global climate agreements. Although Rogelj et al. [8] briefly
examined the impact of different short-term 2020 greenhouse
gas (GHG) targets on the premature retirement of coal-based
power plants, no previous research has thoroughly explored the
impacts of climate policy on stranded capacity and its associated
costs.
In this study, we use the MESSAGE–MACRO integrated
assessment model [9,10] and several climate policy scenarios,
including a subset that was developed within the context of
the AMPERE model inter-comparison project2 [3], to explore
the impact of the stringency of near-term climate policy on
stranded power plant capacity. In particular, the paper
focuses on conventional coal-fired power plants (i.e., coal
combustion plants without CCS) since these plants have the
largest carbon intensity and, thus, are the most likely to be
stranded under policies seeking to remain below a 2 °C
target.
The objectives of this paper are to better understand the
relationship betweennear-term climate policy and stranded coal
capacity assuming a long-term goal of limiting warming to 2 °C
and to explore strategies for reducing stranded capacity. In
Section 2, we describe the scenarios and technologies addressed
in this paper and, in Section 3, explore when and at what rate
coal-basedpower generation is phasedout under different policy
scenarios. In Section 4, we then quantify themagnitude and cost
of the resulting stranded capacity in each scenario and, in
Section 5, explore strategies for reducing stranded capacity.
These strategies include: 1) focusing on energy intensity
improvements (measured as final energy use per unit GDP); 2)
extending the lifetime of existing power plants to reduce the
need for new capacity; 3) providing emission exemptions for
pre-existing plants (i.e., grandfathering) with an emphasis on
the consequences for meeting the long-term 2 °C target; and 4)
retrofitting plants with CCS.
2. Scenario implementation and technology descriptions
Scenarios with a range of GHG emission targets3 in 2030 are
used to explore the impact of near-term climate policy on
stranded power plant capacity assuming a common long-term
goal of limiting warming to 2 °C (Table 1). These scenarios
represent seven discrete emission targets that span the range
between the optimal and high short-term targets specified in the
AMPERE project [3]. The lowest (i.e., optimal) target represents a
stringent policy scenario in which immediate action is taken to
meet the specified long-term climate objective,while the highest
target is consistent with a 2030 target extrapolated from
implementation of only the low-ambition unconditional Copen-
hagen pledges for 2020 [3]. Thus, higher near-term targets
represent progressively less stringent climate policy (and
mitigation) through 2030. However, it should be noted that
even the least stringent near-term target (60.8 Gt CO2e in
2030) still represents a 12% reduction in 2030 emissions
relative to a scenario with absolutely no climate policy.
It should also be emphasized that all scenarios seek to
achieve the same long-term objective, which is to limit the
increase in global mean temperature relative to pre-industrial
levels to below 2 °C in 2100. Thus, scenarios with less stringent
near-termpolicy (i.e., reducedmitigation) until 2030will require
a more rapid transition to a low carbon energy system, and thus
more aggressive mitigation after 2030, to meet the long-term
objective [2,6]. All scenarios also assume that all mitigation
technologies represented in the model are available (i.e., no
restricted portfolio cases are considered) and that all countries
participate in climate mitigation efforts at the same time (i.e., no
delayed participation [12] or non-participation by certain
regions). In addition, a low energy intensity (LowEI) scenario
is examined in which the future energy intensity improve-
ment rate is increased by about 50% relative to the
reference scenario (RefEI).4 The LowEI scenario is only
examined with the least stringent near-term policy and is
intended to assess the extent to which energy efficiency
improvements can reduce stranded capacity in a weak
policy environment.5
In the remainder of this paper, scenarios are identified
by a combination of their energy intensity assumption
and short-term target (e.g., RefEI-56.8), as summarized in
Table 1. By default, all scenarios assume a power plant
lifetime of 30 years and no grandfathering (i.e. plants are
prematurely retired when carbon prices become sufficiently
2 AMPERE is an acronym for “Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation
Pathways and Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost Estimates”.
The AMPERE project explores several long-term GHG mitigation scenarios
using a collection of IAMs with the objective of better understanding the
uncertainties arising from differences among models. A major thrust of this
project is to evaluate the impacts of various near-term GHG emission targets
(for the year 2030) on the cost and feasibility of achieving long-term climate
objectives ([3] in this issue).
3 GHG emissions include all Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, and F-gases)
emitted from fossil fuel and land-use sources. The global warming potentials
used to translate non-CO2 emissions to CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions are
from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report for a 100-year time horizon [11].
The newly added gas NF3 is not included.
4 Energy intensity improvement rates in the RefEI and LowEI scenarios are
about 1.3%/year and 1.9%/year, respectively.
5 Note that the GHG emission target in 2030 in LowEI-57.8 is less than the
highest near-term target met by a RefEI scenario (60.8 Gt CO2e/year). This is
because, with low energy intensity, the largest emissions achievable in 2030
are 57.8 Gt CO2e/year, even when the full century emission budget is
unconstrained.
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large).6 Scenarios that evaluate different plant lifetimes (30, 40,
and 50 years) are identified by the plant lifetime and scenarios
that examine different assumptions regarding the market
penetration of CCS retrofits are identified as “Bound” or
“Unbound”.
The MESSAGE–MACRO integrated assessment model com-
bines a global (multi-sector, multi-region, multi-gas) systems
engineering optimization model (MESSAGE) [10] with an
aggregated macro-economic model (MACRO) [9] and a simple
climate model (MAGICC) [14–17]. MESSAGE is a linear optimi-
zationmodel that minimizes the total discounted energy system
cost over the time horizon from 1990 to 2110 using perfect
foresight (for more information on MESSAGE-MACRO, see the
supplementary material). The optimal scenario (RefEI-52.4) is
run with the default setup using perfect foresight over the full
century while the other scenarios with near-term targets use a
two-phase approach that mimics limited foresight to 2030 [18].
In the first stage, a perfect foresight scenario is run over the full
centurywith a long-term emission budget that allows themodel
to hit the near-term emission target in 2030. This first run is used
to fix the solution through 2030, and then another perfect
foresight scenario is run with a smaller long-term budget that
achieves the long-term target. Since the long-term budget used
in the first phase exceeds the budget used in the second phase,
capacity expansions are planned prior to 2030 without anticipa-
tion of the rapid shift in climate policy and the large reduction in
coal electricity that will be necessary after 2030 to meet the
long-term target. Thus, the model assumes that utilities and
plant operators have limited foresight of no more than 10 years
when planning during the 2021–2030 period.
The myopic, or limited foresight, setup mimics policy
scenarios in which there is uncertainty regarding long-term
climate policy after 2030 and, thus, plant operators must
make near-term planning decisions based on current carbon
prices and their expectation of future climate policy. Given
more policy certainty and, thus, more foresight, it should
be noted that plant operators would likely make different
decisions. However, the different 2030 emission targets
examined in this paper essentially represent a range of possible
near-term planning responses given different expectations
of long-term climate policy. For example, RefEI-60.8 and
RefEI-52.9 are scenarios in which planning decisions before
2030 are made with expectations of long-term (2000–2100)
cumulative CO2 emission budgets of ~2500 Gt and ~1600 Gt,
respectively. For comparison, note that the AMPERE project
assumes a cumulative CO2 emission budget of 1500 Gt for
limitingwarming to 2 °C in 2100 [3],which is consistentwith the
budget achieved in the perfect foresight (RefEI-51.4) scenario.
Of particular relevance to this paper is the method with
which MESSAGE tracks new power plant capacity and the
vintage structure of existing plants, which both have conse-
quences for plant retirement and, thus, stranded capacity.
The required new electricity capacity for each power plant
technology in each time period is calculated based on the
endogenously optimized generation mix (i.e., how much
electricity must be produced by each technology), the
exogenously-specified maximum load factor of each technol-
ogy, and the existing capacity from previous time periods,
which is tracked based on the exogenously-specified technol-
ogy lifetime.7 Under perfect foresight and the objective of
minimizing total system cost, the model will generally attempt
to build the least new capacity required in each period to meet
electricity demand (i.e., it will maximize the load factor).
However, in scenarioswithmyopic foresight,MESSAGEmay find
itself with over-capacity of certain technologies and determine
that it is optimal to operate them at partial load and, thus, strand
capacity. Once new capacity is installed, it is maintained in the
model for its specified lifetime, after which it is retired.
The analysis of stranded capacity in this paper focuses on
conventional coal (i.e., combustion) power plants without CCS
since these plants are most rapidly phased out with stringent
climate policy.8 In MESSAGE, conventional coal power plants
are represented by three individual technologies: 1) subcritical
plants without flue gas desulphurization (FGD) and nitrogen
oxide (NOx) removal, 2) subcritical plants with FGD and NOx
removal, and 3) advanced supercritical coal plantswith FGD and
NOx removal. The availabilities, costs, efficiencies, andmaximum
load factors of these technologies vary through time and by
region. Thus, globalmeans for the cost, efficiency, and load factor
parameters are calculated after running each scenario and
account for the deployment in each region (see supplementary
material). Plant output includes both electricity and heat. In
the remainder of this paper, results are aggregated for the
three technologies andreferred toas conventional coalwithoutCCS.
3. Phase-out of coal-based power generation
The stringency of near-term climate policy will impact the
timing of the phase-out of fossil-based electricity generation
6 The standard lifetime for coal power plants in MESSAGE is 30 years,
which is consistent with the typical ﬁnancing period for these plants [13].
Although plants can operate for much longer periods, additional capital
investment is generally required to renovate and/or replace old components
and this cost is not included in the capital and annual O&M costs in
MESSAGE. Moreover, given the 30-year ﬁnancing period, it can be argued
that shutting down a plant after 30 years does not result in any stranded
capital investment since the initial capital cost has been fully paid at this
time.
7 In the historic period (1990–2005), the electricity generation by each
technology and by region is calibrated to IEA data [19,20]. The vintage of
capacity installed pre-1990 is also tracked in each region by exogenously
specifying the total installed capacity in 1985 and a growth rate that
identiﬁes how quickly capacity expands up to the 1985 value in each region
[21].
8 Integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle (IGCC) coal plants, both with and
without CCS, and conventional coal plants with CCS are also represented in
MESSAGE, but were not considered in this analysis. A negligible amount of
IGCC without CCS is installed (b12 GW) over the century and coal plants
with CCS are built after 2030 and are well-utilized. Thus, coal plants with
CCS do not suffer from signiﬁcant stranded capacity.
Table 1
Summary of scenario abbreviations.
Energy
intensity
Short-term target in
2030 (Gt CO2e/year)
Equivalent scenario in
AMPERE [3]
RefEI 51.4 450-FullTech-OPT
52.9 450-FullTech-LST
54.8 N/A
56.8 N/A
57.8 N/A
58.8 N/A
60.8 450-FullTech-HST
LowEI 57.8 450-LowEI-HST
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without CCS and the rate at which it occurs. It is expected that a
more rapid rate of phase-out will result in more stranded capa-
city since recently built plants will need to be retired prema-
turely. Fig. 1 illustrates the electricity generated by conventional
coal and natural gas power plantswithout CCS in the seven RefEI
scenarios and one LowEI scenario. The differences in the gene-
ration pathways of the two technologies highlight why stranded
capacity is expected to be more significant for conventional coal
power plants than for natural gas power plants.
In the scenario with the most stringent near-term policy
(RefEI-51.4), coal-based generation remains at the 2010 level
until 2020, gradually declines after 2020, and then is phased
out completely after 2050. As near-term climate policy becomes
less stringent (i.e. the 2030 emission target increases),
electricity generation from coal increases in the 2011–2030
period. However, in all scenarios except the ones with the
highest targets (RefEI-60.8 and RefEI-58.8), generation begins to
decline after 2020 and is phased out completely after 2050.
LowEI-57.8 follows a similar generation pathway, but the
increase in the 2011–2020 period is less than expected given
the target. In RefEI-60.8, global coal-based generation con-
tinues to expand until 2030 and then is rapidly phased out
over a very short period (~10 years) with less than 1 EJ/
year of global generation after the 2031-2040 period.
In contrast, natural gas-based generation until 2030 does not
significantly vary between the RefEI scenarios, despite the
different policy regimes. Even after 2030, significant generation
from natural gas continues for two decades and is not phased
out completely until after 2080. Although the low energy
intensity scenario requires less natural gas-based generation
through 2030, more natural gas is used in the 2031–2050
period. These deployment patterns indicate that natural
gas-based electricity generation is used as a bridging tech-
nology to achieve emission reductions in the mid-term [4].
Because the phase-out of natural gas-based electricity occurs
later in time and is more gradual, plant operators, as modeled
by MESSAGE, have more foresight in planning new capacity
and can, thus, minimize stranded capacity. Fig. 1 also indicates
that limitingwarming to 2 °C in 2100 requires that both natural
gas and coal-based electricity generation without CCS are
completely phased out by the end of the century.
To better understand the likelihood of stranded capacity, not
only the timing, but also the rate of phase-out is important since a
more rapid phase-out should result in more stranded capacity.
Fig. 2 illustrates the required annual change in conventional
coal capacity without CCS for the periods from 2011 to 2030
and from 2031 to 2050.9 As near-term climate policy becomes
less stringent, fewer reductions in coal capacity are required
during the 2011–2030 period and capacity even increases in
the scenarios with high 2030 emission targets. However, fewer
reductions in the 2011–2030 period must be offset by much
Fig. 1. Electricity generation in each scenario for a) conventional coal power plants without CCS and b) natural gas power plants without CCS (Values are
representative of each period (e.g., 2040 represents the period from 2031 to 2040)). Historical data is from IEA [22,23].
9 The required reduction in conventional coal capacity is calculated by
converting the difference in electricity generation over each period to
capacity assuming an average load factor of 80% for all plants. The annual
value is then estimated by dividing the period length. It indicates how much
capacity would need to be reduced to avoid stranded capacity, not the actual
capacity reductions occurring in each scenario. These periods were selected
because they represent the two 20-year periods in which the transition to
stringent climate policy occurs and, thus, are the periods when unanticipat-
ed reductions will occur.
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larger reductions during the 2031–2050 period since all
scenarios completely phase out conventional coal after 2050
and, thus, achieve the same required retirement rate over the
period from 2011 to 2050 (~60 GW/year). In essence, reducing
the stringency of near-term policy delays reductions in coal
capacity and, thus, increases the reductions required in the
2031–2050 period and the risk of stranded capacity. However,
the rate of reduction shown in Fig. 2 includes both capacity that is
retired at the end of its design lifetime as well as capacity that is
retired prematurely. It is this latter type of capacity retirement
that constitutes stranded capacity and which will be explored in
more depth in the next section.
4. Stranded coal capacity and costs
Although the timing and rate of the phase-out of conven-
tional coal electricity generationwithout CCShint that significant
coal capacity will be stranded in these scenarios, the actual
stranded capacity also depends on how quickly plants that have
fulfilled their full design lifetimes can be retired.10 If the rate
of planned retirement matches the rate of required capacity
reduction, then stranded capacity will not materialize. However,
if planned retirement is insufficient, then capacity, and even entire
plants,must be retiredprematurely, resulting in stranded capacity.
4.1. Magnitude of stranded capacity
At the global level, the total installed capacity and total
electricity generation in each period can be used to calculate a
mean actual load factor for conventional coal plants which can
then be compared with the potential load factor as an
indicator of stranded global capacity (Fig. 3). In the next two
decades (2011–2030), stranded capacity is expected to be
small regardless of near-term policy since the actual
load factor is only slightly smaller than the range for the
potential load factor. However, more stranded capacity is
expected during this period with more stringent policy in the
near-term. Incontrast, the load factors in the following twodecades
(2031–2050) suggest that stranded capacity will increase
significantly as near-term climate policy becomes less stringent.
The actual stranded capacities in the RefEI scenarios are
consistent with the expectations suggested by the mean
actual load factors.11 In general, as the stringency of climate
policy declines and annual GHG emissions in 2030 increase,
the stranded capacity in the 2011–2030 period decreases and
the stranded capacity in the 2031–2050 period increases
(Fig. 4). In the first two decades, stranded capacity increases
with the stringency of near-termpolicy becausemore stringent
policy requires greater reductions in conventional coal capacity
in the near-term, which cannot be entirely achieved given
existing capacity commitments. In contrast, less stringent
near-term policy decreases stranded capacity in the first
two decades, but also results in additional coal capacity commit-
ments in 2030 and, thus, increases the urgency with which coal
must be phased out in the following two decades. As a result,
stranded capacity increases in the following two decades as
near-termpolicy stringency declines. Inthescenariowiththeleast
stringent policy (RefEI-60.8), the stranded capacity is equivalent to the
premature retirement of about 2.8 500-MW power plants every
month worldwide over the 20-year period from 2031 to 2050.
Fig. 4 indicates that the stringency of near-term climate
policy entails a trade-off between stranding capacity in the
near-term (2011–2030) and in the mid-term (2031–2050).
Up to a 2030 emission target of ~55 Gt CO2e, the stranded
capacity in each period roughly balances, resulting in the
mean value over the entire 40-year period remaining relatively
flat (red dotted line). This finding suggests that someweakening
of near-term policy may have little impact on stranded
conventional coal capacity. However, mean stranded capacity
more thandoubles in the scenarioswith the least stringent policy
(RefEI-58.8 and RefEI-60.8).
10 In MESSAGE, conventional coal plants have a default lifetime of 30 years.
11 Actual stranded capacity is calculated for each coal technology and in
each period by estimating the capacity needed to generate the projected
heat and electricity outputs assuming that the plants are operating at the
potential global load factors listed in the supplementary material. This
capacity is then subtracted from the total installed capacity in the energy
system to identify the stranded capacity.
Fig. 2. Change in required conventional coal capacity without CCS in 2011–2030 and 2031–2050 (black dashed line indicates total 2011–2050 change).
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4.2. Cost of stranded capacity
The undiscounted cumulative stranded investments12
associated with stranded capacity in each of the scenarios
are summarized in Fig. 5. The stranded investments
illustrate the same general trend indicated by the stranded
capacity estimates. Specifically, there is a tradeoff in the
stranded investment associated with each time period
depending on the stringency of near-term policy and total
investment does not increase dramatically until the 2030
emission target exceeds ~55 Gt CO2e.13 However, the relative
12 The stranded investment is calculated in each period by multiplying the
stranded capacity (GW) by the annualized capital cost ($/GW/year) and the
period length (years) and, thus, assumes that the capacity is stranded for the
entire period. The annualized capital cost is based on a 30-year plant lifetime
and real interest rate of 5% (i.e., capital recovery factor of 6.5%). Capital costs
are listed in the supplementary material and all calculations assume that the
oldest plants are stranded ﬁrst (i.e., stranded capacity in the 2031–2040
period is assumed to ﬁrst come from plants built in 2011–2020 period and
then from plants built in later periods). All costs are in 2005 U.S. dollars.
Fig. 4.Mean stranded capacity of conventional coal power plants over the 40-year period from2011 to 2050. Black lines indicatemean stranded capacity for 2011–2030 and
2031–2050 and the red dotted line indicates the value for the entire 40-year period. The red diamond represents the stranded capacity for LowEI-57.8 over the 40-year
period.
Fig. 3. Mean plant load factors in 2011–2030 and 2031–2050 comparedwith the range for the potential load factor (gray shaded area). Note that the potential load factor is
shown as a range since it depends on the time period and the mix of different coal plant types in the energy system (see supplementary material).
13 In fact, the net present value (NPV) of stranded investment, using a 5%
discount rate, remains essentially ﬂat until ~55 Gt CO2e because stranded
investment gets progressively shifted to later time periods as policy
becomes less stringent. However, beyond 55 Gt CO2e, the NPV trend is
similar to the undiscounted trend with stranded investment increasing as
policy in 2030 becomes less stringent.
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increase in investment is much larger than the relative
increase in stranded capacity in most scenarios. For example,
the RefEI-54.8 scenario has ~10% more stranded capacity
than the RefEI-51.4 scenario, but a roughly 35% larger
stranded investment. The reason for the disproportionate
increase in investment is the fact that more new coal
capacity is installed in the 2021–2030 period as the 2030
emission target increases and the majority of this new
capacity is supercritical coal, which is more efficient but also
more expensive. As a result, the mean per-GW stranded
investment after 2030 increases with less stringent policy.
This finding also suggests that a strategy to reduce near-term
emissions by replacing old coal power plants with new more
efficient and expensive plants in the next two decades would
ultimately increase the stranded investment in scenarios with a
2 °C long-term target.
As the stringency of climate policy declines in the RefEI
scenarios, the global stranded investment associated with
stranded conventional coal capacity more than triples
from $165 to $550 billion over the 2011–2050 period. This
is equivalent to 5–17% of the projected investment in
fossil-based electricity generation over this period (~$3 trillion)
and 1–4% of the projected investment in all electricity
generation (~$15 trillion). However, in the scenario with the
largest stranded investment (RefEI-60.8), over 75% of the
investment occurs in only two regions, South Asia (SAS), which
includes India, and Centrally Planned Asia (CPA), which
includes China, and in the 20-year period from 2031 to 2050
(Fig. 6). Thus, the cost implications of stranded capacity can be
much larger at the regional level. For example, the stranded
investments in CPA and SAS during the 2031–2050 period are
equivalent to 76% and 55%, respectively, of the projected
investment in fossil-based electricity generation and 10% and
11%, respectively, of the projected investment in all electricity
generation in each region over the same period. However, in
the scenario with the most stringent near-term policy
(RefEI-51.4), no stranded capacity is projected in SAS and CPA.
Instead, stranded investments are largest in North America
(NAM), the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and Western Europe
(WEU). Thus, reducing the stringency of near-term policy
shifts the burden of stranded coal capacity from developed
regions to developing regions. As a result, despite the existing
near-term commitments to new coal capacity in SAS and CPA,
these regions will have less stranded capacity in the long-term
under more stringent near-term policy.
5. Strategies to reduce stranded capacity
Given the significant stranded conventional coal capacity
associatedwithweaknear-termpolicy, this section explores four
strategies for reducing stranded capacity and its associated costs.
The first strategy is to focus on energy intensity improvements
that can help to reduce electricity demand and, thus, also the
construction of newcoal-basedpower plant capacity. The second
strategy is to extend the lifetimes of existing coal power plants so
that fewer plantsmust be retired in the near-term and, thus, less
new capacity is required over the next 20 years. It is hypothe-
sized that reducing the capacity of new builds in the 2011–2030
period, either through reduced electricity demand or extending
plant lifetimes, will translate to less stranded capacity in the
2031–2050 period. The third strategy is to grandfather existing
power plants (i.e., provide emission exemptions), which would
eliminate stranded capacity by allowing the plants to continue
to operate without penalty. However, this strategy will also
increase GHG emissions from the electricity sector and may
have significant implications for achieving the long-term
target. The fourth strategy is to retrofit conventional coal
power plants with CCS to reduce their CO2 emissions and,
thus, mitigate additional costs associated with carbon prices
under stringent climate policy.
5.1. Energy intensity improvements
The RefEI scenarios indicate that the magnitude and cost
of stranded capacity increase when the stringency of near-
term climate policy declines. However, these scenarios assume
reference energy intensity improvements, which correspond
with a continuation of historical rates of energy intensity
improvement (~1.3%/year). It is also interesting to examine
whether concerted efforts to improve energy efficiency and
reduce energy intensity, as in LowEI-57.8, can help to reduce
the stranded capacity of conventional coal power plants under
less stringent near-term policy.
Improved energy efficiency reduces energy demand and,
thus, less electricity generation and fewer coal power plants are
required in the period from 2011 to 2030 relative to RefEI-57.8,
Fig. 5. Global stranded investment associated with stranded conventional coal capacity from 2011 to 2100.
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whichhas the same2030 emission target (Fig. 1).14 Furthermore,
the reduction in energy intensity decreases the pressure to
reduce carbon intensity, resulting in amore gradual phase-out of
fossil-based generation. The combination of less new capacity
through 2030 and reduced urgency to decrease carbon intensity
translates to much less stranded capacity than expected given
the emission level in 2030 (Fig. 4). In fact, stranded capacity is
smaller than all other scenarios over the entire 40-year period.
These findings are reflected in the stranded investment, which
suggests that improved energy efficiency can reduce the cost of
stranded capacity by more than 65% relative to RefEI-60.8
(Fig. 5). Even relative to the scenario with the most stringent
near-term policy (RefEI-51.4), the stranded investment is only
6% larger in the LowEI scenario, which suggests that demand-
side energy efficiency improvements offer a good strategy for
electric utilities and energy-service providers to hedge against
future climate policies, as they reduce potential stranded
investments. This finding adds to the list of benefits associated
with reducing energy intensity that have been identified in the
literature [4,24].
5.2. Extending plant lifetime
MESSAGE accounts for the age (i.e., vintage) of long-lived
infrastructure when making investment decisions regarding
the timing of the replacement or phase-out of existing energy
technologies (see Section 2). The default setup assumes that
conventional coal power plants have a maximum lifetime of
30 years, but the model also allows for the premature
retirement of unused capacity. In reality, many coal plants
operate for much longer periods, even exceeding 50 years. In
this section, we examine two additional scenarios in which
the lifetimes of all conventional coal plants are extended for
either 40 or 50 years.15 These scenarios are conducted for
only the least stringent policy scenario (RefEI-60.8).
In each lifetime extension scenario, all plants are extend-
ed for the specified operating lifetime. However, we assume
that the capital investments are financed over a 30-year
period so that these investments are paid off after 30 years.
Thus, in these scenarios, plant lifetime can be extended to the
maximum lifetime, but a plant can be retired after 30 years
without financial penalty.16 The aim is to minimize stranded
capacity by using extended lifetimes in the near-term to
reduce the need to build new capacity while allowing for
short lifetimes in the mid-term to reduce stranded capacity.
As expected, the results indicate that extending the
lifetime of conventional coal plants reduces the need to
install new capacity in the near-term since older plants
continue to operate longer (Fig. 7a). It is also interesting that,
with a 2 °C long-term target, no new conventional coal
capacity without CCS is built after 2030 even with the least
stringent near-term climate policy. The reduction in new
14 The RefEI and LowEI scenarios all exhibit an increase in the share of total
ﬁnal energy supplied by electricity over time since many sectors become
increasingly electriﬁed under climate policy. However, the phenomenon of
increased electriﬁcation is slowed in the LowEI scenario since there is less
pressure to reduce carbon intensity and, thus, move to cleaner energy, given
the smaller total energy demand. Thus, the total electricity demand is
smaller in LowEI-57.8 than RefEI-57.8.
15 Note that a change in technology lifetime impacts the vintage structure
in not only future time periods, but also historic time periods since MESSAGE
tracks capacity installments pre-1985. Although the total installed capacity
in the historic time periods is relatively ﬁxed for each technology based on
the load factor and the calibrated electricity generation, the new installed
capacity depends on the vintage structure of the pre-existing capacity,
which changes with lifetime. Thus, the new installed capacity in historic
time periods is different in each of the lifetime extension scenarios, which
leads to different vintage structures into the future. Essentially, the
extension scenarios examine the implications of MESSAGE assuming a 40
or 50-year standard lifetime for conventional coal plants instead of 30 years.
16 Throughout this paper, the cost of stranded capacity is equated with the
stranded capital investment. We do not consider the opportunity cost
associated with the additional revenue that could be earned by keeping a
plant operating. This is not an issue when the ﬁnancing period matches the
plant lifetime (e.g., 30-year scenario), but there would be an opportunity
cost in the 40 and 50-year scenarios where the ﬁnancing period is less than
the potential operating lifetime.
Fig. 6. Stranded investment associated with stranded conventional coal assets by region from 2011 to 2050 for the RefEI-60.8 scenario. CPA (Centrally Planned Asia and
China), SAS (South Asia), NAM (North America), AFR (Sub-saharan Africa),WEU (Western Europe),MEA (Middle East andNorth Africa), LAM (Latin America), FSU (Former
Soviet Union), PAO (Pacific OECD), EEU (Eastern Europe), PAS (Pacific Asia). See supplementary material for list of countries in each region.
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capacity in the 2011–2030 period translates to less total
installed capacity in the following two decades, assuming
that the new capacity built after 2010 is not extended beyond
30 years (Fig. 7b). Thus, the combination of extending the
lifetime of coal plants existing in 2010 and limiting the
lifetime of plants built after 2010 is expected to reduce
stranded capacity.
The undiscounted cumulative stranded investment in each
scenario supports the hypothesis that extending the lifetimes of
existing plants can help to avoid stranded capacity (Fig. 8). In the
Fig. 7. a) Total new capacity and b) total installed capacity of conventional coal power plants without CCS for each plant lifetime scenario. Solid bars indicate
capacities when plant lifetime can be extended, but can also be limited to 30 years without penalty. Hatched bars indicate the additional capacity if all plants are
operated for the maximum lifetime specified in each scenario (e.g., with grandfathering).
Fig. 8. Stranded investment in 2011–2030 and 2031–2050 for each plant lifetime scenario.
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40-year scenario, stranded investment is only reduced by about
1% relative to the 30-year scenario because, given myopic
foresight in 2030, the model chooses to generate significantly
more electricity from conventional coal in 2030 than in the 30 or
50-year scenarios. Then, when climate policy becomes more
stringent after 2030, much of the conventional coal capacity
is immediately stranded, leading to significant stranded invest-
ment in the 2031–2040 period. Because the difference in stran-
ded investment is so small, it is difficult to state a definitive
conclusion regarding the impact of the 40-year lifetime exten-
sion as it may fluctuate depending on the assumed historic
vintage structure of plants.17 However, in the 50-year scenario,
the conclusion is more robust with a 38% reduction in stranded
investment relative to the 30-year scenario. This scenario
suggests that minimizing the installation of new conventional
coal capacity in the next two decades by keeping existing plants
operating is an effective strategy for reducing stranded capacity
in themid-term. Essentially, scenarios that seek to limitwarming
to 2 °C require that conventional coal capacity without CCS is
rapidly phased out after 2030, meaning that most of the new
capacity built in the 2011–2030 period will be stranded in the
following two decades. Consequently, the construction of new
coal capacity without CCS, even if more efficient, should be
minimized.
5.3. Grandfathering
Another strategy to eliminate stranded capacity and its
associated costs is to provide exemptions for existing plants
through grandfathering, as done for example in the European
emission trading scheme (ETS) [25]. This strategy would
essentially allow existing plants to continue to run without
emission penalties at their potential load factors for their design
lifetimes. Although this approach would eliminate stranded
capacity, it would also allow significant additional CO2 emissions
that may increase the likelihood of exceeding the 2 °C target,
unless more costly mitigation options are adopted to compen-
sate for the additional emissions.
In this section, we estimate the additional CO2 emissions
associated with each scenario in Table 1 that would result
if all stranded capacity was instead operated for its entire
lifetime and analyze the implications of these additional
emissions for meeting the long-term climate objective.18 For
simplicity, we assume that the additional electricity generated
from coal-fired power plants displaces low-carbon sources, such
as wind and solar,19 and that plant operators are given no
notice of grandfathering so that they do not over-install
capacity prior to the exemption deadline. The additional
emissions are calculated based on the potential load factors
and plant efficiencies for each plant type (see supplemen-
tary material) and using an emission factor of 94.6 tCO2 per
TJ of coal input [26].20
The impact of additional CO2 emissions on achieving the
2 °C target depends primarily on the additional cumulative
emissions over time, and, thus also, to a smaller degree, on
the timing of these emissions. Fig. 9 indicates that the
increase in global cumulative CO2 emissions resulting from
grandfathering in the scenarios with a 30-year plant lifetime
ranges from 20 to 50 Gt CO2 over the course of the century,
with emissions increasing as near-term climate policy becomes
less stringent. However, even in the scenario with the least
stringent policy (RefEI-60.8), we find only a 3% increase in global
cumulative CO2 emissions above the full century cumulative
emission target (1500 Gt CO2). The timing of the additional
emissions associated with grandfathering differs between
scenarios with additional emissions shifting from the 2011–
2030 period to the 2031–2050 period as near-term policy
becomes less stringent. However, in all scenarios, the additional
emissions associated with grandfathering are concentrated in
the next 40 years (2011–2050).
The implication of additional emissions for the maximum
likelihood of exceeding the 2 °C target over the century is
calculated using MAGICC6 and the cumulative distribution
function for equilibrium climate sensitivity from Rogelj et al.
([14,15,17] and supplementary material). Without grand-
fathering, the maximum likelihood of exceeding the 2 °C
target increases from 48% to 50%, or two percentage points,
as near-term climate policy becomes less stringent (i.e., from
RefEI-51.4 to RefEI-60.8). With grandfathering, the maximum
likelihood in each scenario increases by 0.3–1.3 percentage
points relative to the same scenario without grandfathering
when we assume a 30-year maximum plant lifetime. Con-
sequently, with a 30-year plant lifetime, grandfathering as a
strategy to minimize costs associated with stranded capacity
seems to have a minimal impact on the likelihood of exceeding
the 2 °C target.
However, if a limit is not placed on the length of the
exemption period, grandfathering may incentivize plant
operators to extend the lifetimes of their plants. In this case,
conventional coal plants without CCS could operate as late as
2070 (hatched bars in Fig. 7b). As a result of this continued
operation, Fig. 9 indicates that the increase in full century
cumulative CO2 emissions resulting from grandfathering
increases by ~70 Gt CO2 for each 10-year extension of plant
life. If plant lifetime is extended to 50 years, cumulative
emissions increase by ~180 Gt CO2, which represents a 12%
increase relative to the long-term cumulative emission
target for meeting the 2 °C target (1500 Gt CO2). Thus, the
maximum likelihood of exceeding the 2 °C target can
increase by as much as seven percentage points when the
lifetimes of grandfathered plants are extended, or 3.5 times
the increase in maximum likelihood resulting from reducing
near-term policy stringency. Since the risk of failure to meet
the target increases as plant lifetimes are extended, it is
important that any grandfathering program specify strict
limits on the period of time that plants are eligible to receive
exemptions. Moreover, early notice of a grandfathering
17 Currently, the actual vintage structure of coal plants is unknown by the
model since the historic period is calibrated based on electricity generation
and not new installed capacity.
18 The grandfathering scenarios are not new scenarios, but rather the
additional CO2 emissions are calculated based on the stranded capacities and
efﬁciencies of conventional coal plants in each existing scenario.
19 As a result, these calculations represent the maximum additional
emissions from running the coal plants. If emitting sources, such as natural
gas power plants, were displaced, the additional emissions could be
signiﬁcantly smaller. However, also note that we do not include additional
non-CO2 GHG emissions or the upstream emissions associated with the
mining, transport, and distribution of coal.
20 For plants with efﬁciencies ranging from 32 to 47%, the emission factor
translates to 1065–725 gCO2 per kWh.
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program could trigger large investments in new coal capacity as
utilities may seek to lock-in exemptions before the deadline.
Such a scenario is not examined in this study, but could lead to
much greater risks of failure than the estimates provided.
5.4. CCS retroﬁts
A final strategy to reduce stranded coal capacity under
stringent long-term climate policy is to retrofit existing capacity
with carbon capture and storage (CCS), which entails capturing a
portion of the CO2 emissions at retrofitted plants before it is
released to the atmosphere and then storing it in geologic
reservoirs. This option could potentially improve the economics
of operating conventional coal plants under stringent climate
policy by reducing CO2 emissions and, thus, the associated
economic penalties. However, adding CCS to existing plants also
requires significant additional capital investment and reduces
plant efficiency so that it is unclear whether retrofitting
capacity is preferable to prematurely retiring capacity. This
section discusses two additional scenarios in which CCS
retrofit technologies are available for all conventional coal
power plants under the least stringent near-term climate
policy (i.e., 60.8 Gt CO2e in 2030).
In the first scenario, entitled “Unbound”, the market
penetration rate of CCS retrofits is unconstrained, but the
maximum market penetration is limited to 90% of conventional
coal capacity.21 This scenario explores the degree to which
retrofits could reduce stranded coal capacity under optimistic
conditions in which CCS can be deployed extremely rapidly.
However, given that the model deploys no CCS through 2030, it
is likely that significant technological and regulatory barrierswill
exist that will prevent a rapid deployment in the 2031–2050
period. The second scenario, entitled “Bound”, represents amore
conservative view of the deployment of CCS retrofits, in which
the market penetration of retrofits is constrained. Specifically, a
maximum of 12 GW (i.e., twenty-four 500 MW plants) of
each coal plant type can be retrofit in each region during the
2031–2040 period.22 In both scenarios, CCS retrofits require
an additional capital investment of $1000/kW to $1200/kW
(depending on the time and region), impose a 25% energy
penalty, and capture 90% of emitted CO2. In addition, the lifetime
of each retrofit is assumed to be 20 years since retrofits are
added to existing plant capacity at least one time period
(i.e., decade) after the plants are constructed.
In both the “Bound” and “Unbound” scenarios, installa-
tion of CCS retrofits on supercritical coal capacity built in the
2021–2030 period is maximized (i.e., it is only limited by
constraints on market penetration), while retrofits on
subcritical capacity is nearly maximized. In the “Bound”
scenario, retrofits are installed on 44 GW of conventional
coal capacity globally in the 2031–2040 period, or ~10% of
the new coal capacity without CCS installed in the previous
period (Fig. 10). In the “Unbound” scenario, there is a ten-fold
increase in the deployment of retrofits relative to the “Bound”
scenario to 418 GW globally, or 83% of the new conventional
coal capacity installed in the 2021–2030 period. Assuming
an average nameplate capacity of 500 MW, the “Unbound”
scenario entails installing retrofits onmore than 800 plants over
the course of a single decade, or about 84 plants per year
globally. In contrast, the “Bound” scenario entails installing
retrofits on approximately 9 coal plants per year globally. The
“No Retrofit” scenario is identical to RefEI-60.8 and represents a
scenario in which no retrofits are installed.
Fig. 10 illustrates that as constraints on the deployment
of CCS retrofits decline, retrofits are increasingly installed
on existing conventional coal capacity, which suggests that
retrofitting is a cost-effective strategy for mitigating CO2
emissions. Moreover, Fig. 11a indicates that the deployment
of retrofits at large scale can substantially improve the
utilization of conventional coal-fired power plants in the
21 Even if CCS retroﬁts could be adopted quickly, several factors would
restrict the eligibility of many plants for retroﬁtting, including additional
space requirements for retroﬁt equipment and proximity to suitable CO2
storage sites [27].
22 There are three conventional coal technologies and 11 regions so, even
in the conservative scenario, if all regions were to maximize their
implementation of retroﬁts, almost 400 GW could be installed globally in
the 2031–2040 period alone. However, since coal-based electricity is
concentrated in only a few regions (Fig. 6) and generated by a limited set
of technologies in each region, deployment is much more limited in this
scenario.
Fig. 9. Increase in global cumulative CO2 emissions (2011–2100) resulting from grandfathering. The RefEI and LowEI scenarios with 30-year plant lifetimes are
indicated by the thick black line and red diamond, respectively. The RefEI-60.8 scenarios with plant lifetime extensions are indicated along the black dotted line.
99N. Johnson et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 89–102
2031-2050 period and, thus, reduce stranded capacity. In
fact, stranded investment can decline by as much as 70% if
deployment is largely unconstrained, as in the “Unbound”
scenario (Fig. 11b). However, the reduction in stranded
investment is small when deployment of CCS retrofits is
constrained, as in the “Bound” scenario, which suggests that
the effectiveness of retrofits for reducing stranded capacity
depends on how quickly the technology can be deployed in
the 2031-2040 period. Thus, if this strategy is to be effective, it is
crucial that research, development, and demonstration (RD&D)
projects are conducted over the next two decades to ensure that
CCS retrofits and all associated infrastructure, including CO2
transport and injection, can be deployed rapidly post-2030.
6. Conclusions
The scenarios examined in this study all indicate that
limiting warming to 2 °C over the course of the century will
require the complete phase-out of coal-based electricity
generation without CCS by 2050. However, the timing and
rate of this phase-out depend on the stringency of near-term
climate policy. As near-term policy becomes less stringent,
the phase-out of conventional coal capacity is delayed,
resulting in larger capacity commitments in 2030 and, thus,
the need for a more aggressive phase-out of capacity during
the 2031–2050 period.
The increase in the rate of phase-out amplifies the risk
of stranded capacity, which is supported by the finding that
stranded capacity and its associated cost increase as near-term
policy becomes less stringent. However, we find that stranded
investment does not increase significantly when the near-term
GHG emission target is below about 55 Gt CO2e, which suggests
that near-term climate policy can be weakened moderately
without much impact on stranded coal capacity. In scenarios
with the least stringent near-term policies (i.e., with targets of
59–61 Gt CO2e), stranded investment more than triples relative
to the scenarioswith themost stringent policies (i.e., with targets
of 51–53 Gt CO2e). As a result, it is important to identify and
Fig. 10. Total installed capacity of retrofitted and non-retrofitted conventional coal power plants in the three retrofit scenarios. The “No Retrofit” scenario is
equivalent to RefEI-60.8.
Fig. 11. A comparison of a) mean load factor and b) stranded investment in each of the three retrofit scenarios.
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examine strategies that can help electric utilities and energy-
service providers reduce stranded capacity, particularly in less
stringent policy environments.
In this paper, we analyze four strategies for reducing
stranded capacity and its costs: 1) improving energy intensity,
2) extending the lifetime of existing coal-fired power plants, 3)
providing emission exemptions for existing power plants (i.e.,
grandfathering) and 4) retrofitting existing power plants with
CCS. Based on the analysis, four primary conclusions are
identified.
1 Reducing energy demand through energy intensity im-
provements is an effective strategy for avoiding stranded
coal capacity
By reducing electricity demand, improvements in energy
intensity both reduce construction of new coal-based elec-
tricity generation over the next two decades and the urgency
with which coal plants without CCS need to be phased out
after 2030. As a result, stranded capacity is signiﬁcantly
reduced even when comparing a scenario with low energy
intensity and less stringent near-termpolicywith a scenariowith
reference energy intensity and more stringent policy. This
ﬁnding suggests that reducing energy intensity is a good strategy
for electric utilities and energy-service providers to hedge
against uncertainty in future climate policy, as it reduces the
potential cost of stranded capacity in all policy environments.
2 Keeping existing conventional coal capacity operating is
preferable to building new capacity
In all scenarioswith a 2 °C target, most of the conventional coal
capacity built in the 2011–2030 period becomes stranded in
the following two decades unless CCS retroﬁts are widely
deployed. Consequently, strategies that minimize the con-
struction of new coal capacity will result in less stranded
capacity. As mentioned previously, reducing electricity de-
mand is one strategy for avoiding new coal capacity, but our
analysis of plant lifetime extensions also indicates that keeping
existing plants operating is another effective strategy. By
reducing new coal capacity, not only is the magnitude of
stranded capacity reduced, but also themeanper-GW stranded
investment since existing plants tend to have smaller capital
costs than new, more efﬁcient coal plants.
3 Although grandfathering eliminates stranded capacity,
it increases the risk of failing to achieve the long-term
climate objective
Providing emission exemptions for plants built before
stringent policy is imposed (i.e., grandfathering) would
eliminate the cost penalties associated with operating coal-
ﬁred plants in an environment with high carbon prices and,
thus, incentivize the continued operation of these plants.
Although, it has the advantage of eliminating stranded
capacity and its associated costs, it would also lead to
additional GHG emissions and would increase the maximum
likelihood of exceeding the 2 °C target by 0.5–7 percentage
points unless more costly mitigation options are adopted to
compensate for the additional emissions. The probability of
exceeding the target increases as plant lifetimes are extended
so it is important that any grandfathering program limits the
period of time that plants are eligible to receive exemptions.
Moreover, early notice of a grandfathering program could
trigger large investments in new coal capacity as utilities may
seek to lock-in exemptions before the deadline. Such a scenario is
not examined in this study, but could lead to much greater risks
of failure than the estimates provided.
4 Retrofitting conventional coal plants with CCS is an effective
strategy for reducing stranded capacity only if retrofits and the
associated CCS infrastructure can be deployed rapidly
In the scenarios that allow CCS retroﬁts on existing
conventional coal capacity, all retroﬁts are installed in the
period immediately following the switch to more stringent
policy (2031–2040). Thus, the effectiveness of this strategy
for reducing stranded coal capacity depends on how much
capacity can be retroﬁt in a single decade. Given the fact that
these scenarios project no CCS up to 2030, it is uncertain
whether CCS retroﬁts will be able to ramp up quickly enough
and at sufﬁcient scale to signiﬁcantly mitigate stranded
capacity. To reduce the uncertainty, it is crucial that CCS
RD&D projects are started immediately and regulatory and
legal frameworks that will facilitate rapid CCS deployment are
established before 2030. Given the importance of rapid CCS
deployment rates for mitigating stranded coal capacity,
further research is needed to better quantify potential
deployment rates and to identify policy mechanisms for
facilitating CCS deployment.
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